UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/22837
25 July 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the members of the Security Council the attached communication which he has received from the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Annex

Letter dated 25 July 1991 from the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy addressed to the Secretary-General

Please find attached the report of the third IAEA Inspection in Iraq under Security Council resolution 687 (1991). You may deem it appropriate to transmit the report to the members of the Security Council. I remain of course available with the Chief Inspector, Mr. Demetrius Perricos, for any consultations you or the Council may wish to have. I am planning to go to the United States on 28 July.

(Signed) Hans BLIX

Enclosure

REPORT ON THE THIRD IAEA ON-SITE INSPECTION IN IRAQ UNDER SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 687 (1991)

7-18 July 1991

Salient points

The IAEA team, which arrived on the eve of the day when the Government of Iraq disclosed its enrichment programme, devoted most of its time to performing inspections in order to verify the Government's declaration and fill gaps in it and to seeking explanations.

Although the Iraqi side was cooperative in facilitating the team's efforts and provided many clarifications about the declared enrichment programme, the team considers it likely that the full extent of the centrifuge enrichment work has not yet been disclosed; the possibility also exists that there are still undeclared locations with sensitive equipment and material.

The leader of Iraq's enrichment programme, Dr. J. Jaffar, Deputy Chairman of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission and Deputy Minister for Industry and Minerals, denied that any political decision had been taken to use the enrichment programme to develop nuclear weapons. The primary aims were stated to be development of the country's technological and industrial infrastructure and the production of fuel for research reactors and a future nuclear power programme. The team noted that the possibility of combining separators with high capacity/modest separation factor and separators with low capacity/high separation factor suggests a specific intention to produce highly enriched uranium.

Through imports and indigenous production, Iraq had accumulated a large inventory of natural uranium.

Uranium tetrachloride - feed material for the electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS) enrichment method - was produced in a factory outside Mosul and at Tuwaitha. The buildings were severely damaged.

The Iraqi side confirmed earlier inspectors' suspicions that Tarmiya was the main production site for the enrichment of uranium by the EMIS method. A layer of concrete which had been poured over a key component of the separators in order to conceal it was removed at the request of the team, which was then able to confirm that the installation in question had indeed been constructed for enrichment purposes.

The Iraqi side gave the team videotapes showing the inauguration of the Tarmiya plant (in February 1990) and what the plant looked like after the bombing; it had been extensively damaged. The team made a tape of what it looks like now.

On the basis of the design data provided by the Iraqi side, the team considers that Tarmiya, if fully operational, with 90 separators running at design capacity, could have produced up to 15 kilograms of highly enriched (93 per cent) uranium a year, or proportionally more uranium at a lower enrichment.

It was confirmed that, as surmised, the facility at Ash Sharqat had been built as a replica of Tarmiya and was not, as alleged during the inspection, a factory for the plastic coating of equipment. Most of the facility was destroyed by bombing, at which time it was about 85 per cent completed; no separators had yet been installed.

Milligram quantities of uranium enriched to a level of 40-45 per cent and other quantities enriched to lower levels at Tuwaitha were declared. At Tarmiya, batches of uranium with enrichment levels ranging up to 10 per cent were declared, giving together 0.6 kilograms with an average enrichment level of 4 per cent.

It was confirmed that the Research Centre at Tuwaitha was the site of all the research and development work on uranium enrichment, including EMIS, centrifuge enrichment and chemical enrichment. The relevant facilities at Tuwaitha were completely destroyed.

## INTRODUCTION

1. The present report summarizes findings of the third inspection carried out by IAEA under the terms of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) with the assistance and cooperation of the Special Commission of the United Nations. The team consisted of 26 inspectors and 11 supporting staff, comprising 22 nationalities. It was headed by Mr. Demetrius Perricos of IAEA as Chief Inspector. The team arrived in Iraq on 6 July 1991 and started the inspection on 7 July. The original schedule was for the inspection to end on 12 July but, owing to a new declaration of the Iraqi authorities dated 7 July which provided additional information on Iraq's nuclear programme, it was necessary to extend the inspection to 19 July. The team was reduced to 20 inspectors as from 13 July.

2. The inspection team verified, to a large extent, the information contained in the Iraqi declaration of 7 July regarding Iraq's enrichment programme, which was supplemented by information presented to the team at its request on 14 July. A number of follow-up actions have been identified and will have to be performed during subsequent inspection missions. It was not possible for the inspection team to verify the extent of the centrifuge enrichment programme, nor could the team exclude the possibility that there are still undeclared locations with sensitive equipment or material installed, in use or stored. In addition, the industrial and technological infrastructure which has been built in connection with this programme has to be assessed, and the information provided to the team regarding the industrial establishments involved in this effort has to be verified.

3. The process of additional clarification by Iraq and subsequent verification and further questioning by the inspection team went on throughout the two-week inspection period, and it will continue during subsequent inspections. A large number of samples were collected, but they have not yet been analysed; also, many documents, some provided by Iraq and others collected at various sites by the inspection team, have still to be fully evaluated. No access problems were encountered and the attitude of the Iraqi authorities to the team was one of cooperation throughout the period of the inspection.

## I. THE IRAQI ENRICHMENT PROGRAMME

4. According to a statement by Dr. J. Jaffar, leader of the enrichment programme, Vice-Chairman of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission and Deputy Minister for Industry and Minerals, the primary motive for proceeding with a uranium enrichment programme was the expected contribution to the technological and industrial infrastructure of the country regardless of whether the programme was successful. The need for uranium enrichment was ascribed to the need to fuel research reactors and possibly, at some point in the future, power reactors. Dr. Jaffar noted that a capability to produce highly enriched uranium may create, in his words, a "political option" for the

development of nuclear weapons. However, he steadfastly denied that a decision to develop nuclear weapons had been taken or that any weapons development work had been done.

5. At one time or another, gaseous diffusion, electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS), gas centrifuge and chemical exchange technologies were examined by Iraq. The commitment to EMIS for production-scale development and deployment followed early successes with the method and, more importantly, the demonstration that the separator units and magnets could be made in Iraq.

6. According to the disclosures made to date, efforts comparable to that devoted to EMIS were not made as regards other separation technologies. Iraqi declarations indicate that research on gas centrifuge technology was second in priority and that some promising results were recently achieved, including successful single-machine trials with $UF_6$ gas. Operating data from some of these trials were presented to the inspection team on the last day of the inspection period, but it seems likely that the full extent of the centrifuge work has not been disclosed. There is no doubt that Iraq has developed the technological and industrial infrastructure necessary for EMIS. As far as centrifuge enrichment is concerned, Iraq was developing an indigenous technology even if they were dependent on foreign suppliers for key components and materials.

## A. Uranium enrichment research and development at Tuwaitha

7. Research, development and testing of EMIS components were carried out in the Nuclear Physics Building (80).* Reviews of an Iraqi-provided videotape showing the EMIS facilities in the building, together with examinations of components of the 1,000-millimetre separators (this number refers to the radius of the ion beam in the separator tank) and the model 106 ion source test stand are consistent with Iraq's declaration. In the opinion of the inspection team, the facility was not designed for - nor was it capable of - producing enriched uranium in quantity. The Iraqi statement that the only real obstacle remaining in the development of an efficient EMIS system was an improved ion source is consistent with experience elsewhere in the world. Work on graphite collectors and on the configuration of ion sources and collectors was also carried out in this building. Research on EMIS chemistry was carried out in the nearby Chemical Research Building (85). A small pilot line for the production of $UCl_4$ was also contained in this building. Both buildings, 80 and 85, have been levelled and the rubble removed. Experiments with gas centrifuge enrichment were declared by Iraq to have occurred in the Cold Material Testing Building (63).

---

* The numbers in parentheses refer to the locations indicated on the Tuwaitha site map in annex I to the present report.

B. Acquisition of natural uranium (Al Qaim and Akashat)

8. Iraq has accumulated, through imports and indigenous production, a large inventory of natural uranium. The indigenous material is largely from an uranium extraction facility (producing yellow cake) associated with a superphosphate plant at Al Qaim. The facility was extensively damaged during the bombing. There is no evidence that the facility served any purpose beyond that declared. The operator stated that a total of 168 metric tons have been produced since the facility was commissioned in 1984. This amount is considerably below the production capacity of 103 metric tons a year. The operator's explanation was that the uranium content of the phosphate ore was far lower than expected. Samples of the ore were taken to investigate this issue.

9. Akashat is an open-cast mine which feeds Al Qaim. No other activities were detected during the inspection.

C. $UO_2$ conversion and $UCl_4$ production (Mosul Production Facility)

10. The team founded that $UCl_4$ production had been carried out at a facility outside Mosul. A standard production process with $UO_2$ feed and $CCl_4$ as the chlorination reagent was used. The facility included a $UO_2$ conversion capability. It was stated that the $UCl_4$ plant had gone into production in August 1990 and operated for about six months. The plant manager indicated that production had been limited for most of that time because of corrosion problems. The inspection team found no evidence contradicting those statements. The $UCl_4$ production building had suffered substantial damage, and the $UO_2$ building had completely collapsed and was covered with debris. There was also an Iraqi statement that the $UCl_4$ used for EMIS development and testing at Tuwaitha and Tarmiya had been produced in Building 85 at Tuwaitha.

D. EMIS: the facilities at Tarmiya and Ash Shargat

11. The Tarmiya site has been described in previous inspection reports (see S/22788). The third inspection team visited the site again following Iraqi confirmation that the site had been used for EMIS and further declarations regarding the extent of the EMIS installations and operations. The team found evidence confirming statements about the number and type (1,200 mm) of EMIS units installed in Building 33. The process building contained two areas (A and B) for EMIS installations. An eight-separator system (nine magnets) had been installed in area A during January and February 1990. A 17-separator system was in the process of being installed (three magnets were in place) in area B at the time operations ceased.

12. In an attempt to conceal the EMIS equipment from the inspection teams, the return irons and rails for the separators had been covered with concrete. This was removed at the team's request. The length of the installed return

iron in both area A and area B conformed to system specifications provided by Iraq and to independent separator component measurements made by the inspection team.

13. An Iraqi video film made at the time when the installation of magnets, vacuum chambers and end pieces for the eight-separator system was completed (February 1990) and one made in February 1991, after the bombing, were provided to the inspection team. The latter video film appeared to confirm that only three magnets had been installed, without vacuum chambers, and that area B had therefore not yet been operational. A computer printout showing the performance of one of the separators during a run late in December 1990 was provided. The data have not been examined in detail, but it appears that the ion beam current was not up to the design value. The number of separators ultimately intended for Building 33 has not been determined. The facility design provides for a maximum of 70 separators, but Iraqi authorities indicated that no decision had been taken beyond those concerning the 25 separators installed or being installed. Facility specifications indicate that Building 245 was designed to accommodate 20 of the smaller (600 mm) units, which have a higher separation factor. Uranium recovery, the construction and configuration of ion sources and collectors and the construction of separator tank liners were all done at the Tarmiya site.

14. A second facility, a replica of Tarmiya, was being constructed at Ash Sharqat. According to information provided during the inspection, construction at Ash Sharqat started shortly after that at Tarmiya but none of the major buildings had been commissioned. The overall state of completeness was about 85 per cent at the time when most of the facility was destroyed. There was no sign that installed equipment had been removed, as had happened at other sites. The electric power supply to the site is very substantial and, while installation was not complete, the substation serving the site would certainly provide power at a level equivalent to that at Tarmiya. At the time when this site was inspected, the Iraqi authorities had not declared it as a nuclear facility; they stated the purposes of the installations at Ash Sharqat to be the protective coating of large pipes and containers and the production of machine tools. The Iraqi authorities have since stated that the Ash Sharqat facility was constructed from the plans used at Tarmiya. Further, they have indicated that the replication of important buildings had become a policy of the Iraqi Government. It is not clear whether Iraq intended to utilize the Ash Sharqat facility for uranium enrichment as long as the Tarmiya facility continued to function.

E. Material and equipment declarations*

15. Declarations of material directly associated with the operation of EMIS development units in Building 80 at Tuwaitha were provided to the team on the last day of the inspection period. Milligram quantities of uranium enriched up to a level of 40-45 per cent and a few kilograms of uranium depleted down to a level of .02 per cent were included. Material in five enrichment ranges (up to 10 wt. per cent U-235) resulting from the testing of EMIS production units at Tarmiya was declared, and samples were taken. Again, only small amounts of material were involved. This material was declared on 7 July as about 0.5 kg with an average enrichment of 4 per cent.

16. All tell-tale equipment at Tuwaitha, Tarmiya and the Mosul Production Facility had been removed and turned over to the Iraqi Army for destruction and concealment. The Army proceeded to transport the equipment to remote locations where much of it was destroyed and buried. Equipment from Tuwaitha and Tarmiya was distributed among locations 1-5 and 8, and equipment from the Mosul Production Facility was taken to locations 6 and 7 (near Mosul). Much of the equipment was destroyed to the point where it was no longer recognizable. The inspection team tried to concentrate on major EMIS components identified as end pieces, double-pole magnets with coils, vacuum chambers, liners, ion sources and collectors. The end pieces, magnets and vacuum chambers could not be destroyed completely and, given the circumstances, the inventory was reasonably consistent with Iraqi declarations. However, no collectors and only one ion source were found. Several pieces of a collector were eventually provided, but the locating of ion sources and collectors will have to be a major follow-up activity. Iraq's clarification dated 18 July included components (but no ion sources or collectors) for six 600-mm separators intended for installation at Tarmiya. With the exception of one dipole and several coils, this equipment has not been found by the inspection team. The equipment inventories at locations 6 and 7 are consistent with the declared purpose of the Mosul Production Facility. Facilities where EMIS components were fabricated were identified by Iraq. Some of these facilities had been inspected before the declaration, during the second IAEA on-site inspection, as a result of designation by the Special Commission.

17. In the opinion of the inspection team, the broad goals cited by the Vice-Chairman of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission neither require nor justify the construction of a facility the size of Tarmiya, much less two such facilities. Design drawings of Building 33 and Building 245 show a combination of high-capacity/modest separation factor units and low-capacity/high separation factor units. This is the type of arrangement that would be configured if the goal was to produce highly enriched uranium. Design data provided by Iraq indicate that if Tarmiya had become fully

---

* For the area of Tuwaitha and Tarmiya and equipment locations 1-8, see the map contained in annex II to the present report.

operational, with 90 separators running at design capacity, up to 15 kilograms a year of highly enriched uranium or proportionally more uranium at lower enrichments could have been produced using natural uranium as the feed.

### F. Gas centrifuge enrichment

18. In the 7 July declaration, Iraq listed certain gas centrifuge activities, equipment and components. Additional data were also made available, including information about a planned project to build a 100-machine gas centrifuge cascade. Iraq claimed that it had not progressed beyond the point of conducting single-machine trials with $UF_6$ gas and that the technical specifications for its gas centrifuge had not yet been fully determined. It was also claimed that it had had only very limited capabilities for centrifuge component manufacturing and no significant stockpiles of special materials (e.g., 350-grade maraging steel). In addition, it was claimed that there had been only very limited, laboratory-scale activities with $UF_6$.

19. On the basis of the evidence available to date, the inspection team cannot draw conclusions as to whether Iraq's gas centrifuge declarations are complete. A statement made regarding the technical status of machine operations and performance which had been achieved appears plausible, though its accuracy cannot be verified. The precise status of the "planned" project to build a 100-machine gas centrifuge cascade remains a question mark. Furthermore, it appears probable to the team that the full extent (material, equipment and locations) of Iraq's gas centrifuge component manufacturing infrastructure has yet to be revealed.

## II. NUCLEAR MATERIAL VERIFICATION

20. In addition to the reverification activities performed on the nuclear material presented to the first inspection team, the following quantities of nuclear material stated in the declaration of 7 July were verified:

| | (kilograms) |
|---|---|
| Yellow cake | 331 368 (corrected value) |
| $UO_2$ | 116 173 |
| $UCl_4$ | 2 577 |
| $UF_6$ | 0.465 |
| ADU | 1 850 |
| $UO_3$ | 2 050 |
| $UF_4$ | 310 (corrected value) |
| $UO_4$ | 2 255 |

Also, one drum of scrap material and two drums of $UO_4$ sample bottles which had not been included in the 7 July declaration were brought to the Tuwaitha site and verified. The weights of this material were not provided and, owing to its late arrival, it was not possible to determine them. Furthermore, 235 kg of natural uranium in $U_3O_8$ form and four natural uranium fuel elements, which had previously been under safeguards and which were recovered from the rubble after the first inspection, were brought to the storage area at Tuwaitha and verified. The irradiated heavily enriched uranium (HEU) fuel elements in the IRT 5000 reactor were fully verified during the inspection.

21. Hot cells and glove boxes. The hot cells and glove boxes present at Tuwaitha were all inspected, and all the manipulators of the hot cells which had not been severely damaged were sealed for unique identification purposes.

22. Removal of fuel items. The conditions for removal and transportation of both fresh and irradiated highly enriched fuel elements were examined and discussed with the Iraqi authorities. In order to minimize the costs, the Iraqi authorities expressed the wish to perform as many of the activities as possible involved in the removal of fresh fuel and the loading of irradiated fuel into transport containers. Further discussions on this matter will take place in the near future.

## III. OTHER INSPECTIONS

23. Facility near Tuwaitha. The third inspection team examined a facility which the Iraqi side had identified as the Engineering Research Centre under the Ministry of Higher Education. The facility was surrounded by a low berm and a fence and had guard towers at each fence corner. Most of the equipment had been removed but some evidence found in the buildings suggested that the facility was a forensic laboratory of the Ministry of the Interior. The team is confident that no nuclear activities were conducted at the facility.

24. Al Qa Qaa Facility. At the invitation of the Iraqi authorities, inspectors visited this facility, which was declared to be a high-explosive testing facility. It did not appear to the inspectors that the facility possessed the diagnostic capability to support other than conventional explosive and ordnance production.

Annex I

TUWAITHA SITE MAP



/...

Annex II

MAP OF LOCATIONS

---

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/22838
26 July 1991
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 25 JULY 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that United States aircraft continue to violate Iraqi airspace, as follows:

I

1. American air activity inside Iraqi airspace on 22/23 July 1991 amounted to 19 sorties flown by 9 two-aircraft formations and one single aircraft at speeds of 650 to 720 kilometres per hour and at altitudes ranging from 4,000 to 4,500 metres.

2. Air activity centred over Mosul, Arbil and Dohuk, for the purpose of observation and provocation.

II

1. American air activity inside Iraqi airspace on 23/24 July 1991 amounted to 34 sorties flown by 12 two-aircraft formations, 2 three-aircraft formations and four single aircraft at speeds of 600 to 950 kilometres per hour and at altitudes ranging from 3,000 to 8,500 metres.

2. Air activity centred over Arbil, Mosul, Dohuk, Amadiyah and north of Rawanduz, for the purpose of observation and provocation, achieved by ejecting flares and breaking the sound barrier over the area east and north of Arbil.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdul Amir A. AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

---

91-24112 2456i (E)

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/22839
26 July 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The attached letter dated 25 July 1991 from the Permanent Observer of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations was addressed to the President of the Security Council. In accordance with the request therein contained, the letter is being circulated as a document of the Security Council.

Annex

Letter dated 25 July 1991 from the Permanent Observer of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to forward to you information of the Korean People's Army and Chinese People's Volunteers side to the Korean Military Armistice Commission.

I request that this letter, together with the enclosed information of the Korean People's Army and Chinese People's Volunteers side to the Korean Military Armistice Commission, be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) PAK Gil Yon
Ambassador
Permanent Observer

Enclosure

Information of the Korean People's Army and Chinese People's Volunteers side to the Korean military Armistice Commission - July 1991

Thirty-eight years ago the boom of guns of war stopped and the Korean Armistice Agreement was signed at Panmunjom with the objective of ensuring "a complete cessation of all acts of armed force in Korea until a final peaceful settlement is achieved."

For the implementation of the Armistice Agreement (AA) four meetings of the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) and six Secretaries' meetings (two open-door and four closed-door meetings) were held in the last year and this year (1 July 1990-30 June 1991).

The conduct on the part of the United Nations Command (UNC) side during this period proved that it has no concern about the implementation of the AA, tension reduction and maintenance of peace in Korea and that it has been creating artificial obstacles to the routine activities of the armistice supervisory organs.

## Systematic machination of the UNC side to weaken and paralyse the major functions of the Korean Armistice Supervisory organs

The MAC and Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) were organized for the purpose of supervising and observing the implementation of the Korean Armistice Agreement.

The UNC side has been disturbing in every way the activities of the armistice supervisory organs organized by the AA and committing ceaseless criminal acts of paralysing, wrecking and violating their major functions.

### Paralysis of major functions of the MAC

At the 22nd "Republic of Korea (ROK)-United States Security Consultative Meeting" held last year the United States and the south Korean authorities agreed to transfer the Senior Membership of the "UNC" side of the MAC to the south Korean army side and on 25 March 1991 named a south Korean army "general" as the Senior Member of the UNC side.

This is a flagrant violation of the AA and an insult and challenge to the other side of the armistice.

As the Preamble to the Korean Armistice Agreement clearly stipulates the AA was signed between the "Korean People's Army and Chinese People's Volunteers side", on the one hand, and the "United Nations Command side", on the other hand, and "intended to pertain solely to the belligerents in Korea".

All the provisions of the AA must be based on this requirement and paragraph 20 of the AA stipulating the procedures and ways of appointing members of the MAC also can not be exceptional.

Notwithstanding this, the UNC side claims that its Commander-in-Chief can name anyone as its Senior Member because the latter is under the command of the former. This is a distorted interpretation of the spirit of paragraph 20 apart from the requirements and intent of the AA.

As for the south Korean army, it is not a signatory party to the AA, does not belong to the "U.N. Forces" and can not be justified in representing one side of the MAC.

During the armistice talks the south Korean side doggedly opposed the conclusion of the AA saying that the "Republic of Korea" would continue to march towards the north even if the "UN Forces" sign the armistice and went the length of staging demonstrations shouting "We strongly oppose the cease-fire".

What was worse, the south Korean side boycotted the armistice talks starting with the 142nd meeting and did not participate in the ceremony of signing the AA.

Therefore, it is self-evident that the south Korean side can not represent the "UNC" side to the MAC.

In order to justify the unwarrantable replacement of its Senior Member, the United States refers to the fact that two south Korean army officers participate in the MAC meeting as Members of the UNC side. But it is preposterous.

The participation in the MAC meeting of the south Korean army officers as Members of the MAC only shows that the south Korean army is placed under control of the AA, but it does not mean that they are qualified to lead one side of the MAC.

On 15 July 1953, just before the conclusion of the AA, the United States guaranteed our side that the "south Korean 'government' and army would be under the restriction of the AA" and the "UN Forces" would be responsible "for having the south Korean forces strictly abide by the AA".

In the sense that this guarantee is kept, the United States comes to the MAC meeting with the south Korean army officers and we overlook them participating in the meeting so that they are bound to the AA. Therefore, it does not mean that their participation has any legal validity.

In fact, the United States has at present, too, the south Korean army at its beck and call, taking hold of the operational control of the latter and this is why it used to appoint only United States generals to the Senior Membership of the "UNC" side up to its fifty-sixth Senior Member during the past 37 years.

Notwithstanding this, the United States is now attempting to justify its unreasonable replacement of Senior Member taking advantage of the membership of south Korean armymen in disregard of the AA and precedents.

This can not be construed otherwise than a systematic machination designed to create an artificial obstacle to the routine activities of the armistice supervisory organs.

In recent days the United States is arousing public opinion as if it named the south Korean army general to the UNC Senior Membership to have the military representatives of the north and the south sit together. This is also an absurd nonsense.

A mere appearance of a south Korean does not mean that he can represent the position of the south side and meeting him does not mean a meeting of the military representatives between north and south.

If the military representatives from north and south are to meet with each other they should be authorized and qualified to do so by the authorities of both sides respectively.

The south Korean army "general" who was newly appointed to the Senior Membership was named not by the south side but by the "UNC" side.

Therefore, it is crystal clear for whom he will work and what he will do.

Of course, we do not oppose that the north and south sit face to face and we want to do so.

If the United States really intends to have the north and south meet each other it should put the right cap on him and sit him in the right place.

Problems can not be solved by putting the hat of the "UN Forces" on him and placing him in a seat of the "UNC" Senior Membership.

We have already proposed repeatedly to set up a legal and institutional mechanism whereby the north-south military delegates can sit face to face when the United States brought up the question of replacing its Senior Member with a south Korean army "general".

It was an extension of our such sincere efforts that we proposed to hold negotiations of military representatives among us, the United States and south Korea within the framework of the MAC and urged the United States side to seriously examine our proposal re-emphasizing our position at the end of last year.

Such proposal of our side was the reflection of the United States side's claim and the requirement of the created situation and was intended to solve smoothly the problem by all means.

However, the United States side accepted none of these proposals and, at last, unilaterally replaced its Senior Member.

This clearly shows that the United States side is ignoring the AA concluded between both sides and the past practice and that its alleged wish to make the north-south military delegates sit together is nothing but a deception.

The United States named a south Korean army "general" as the "UNC" Senior Member in an attempt to evade its legal obligation to replace the Korean Armistice Agreement with a peace agreement and to obtain some political interest by enhancing the position of south Korea so that she may appear to be equal with us.

Such unjustifiable action of the United States side resulted in the failure of meetings of the MAC organized by the AA and in paralysing the major activities and functions of the MAC including telephone messages and letters between Senior Members of both side.

The responsibility for this rests with the United States side which appointed a south Korean army "general" who has no qualification and right to the "UNC" Senior Membership in disregard of the AA.

<u>The existence of the NNSC has become worthless due to the unwarranted action of the UNC side</u>

The mission of the NNSC is to "carry out the functions of supervision, observation, inspection, and investigation, as stipulated in subparagraphs 13 c and 13 d and paragraph 28 of the AA, and to report the results of such supervision, observation, inspection, and investigation to the Military Armistice Commission".

Paragraph 28 of the AA stipulates that "the senior member of either side of the MAC is authorized to request the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to conduct special observations and inspections at places outside the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) where violations of this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred".

Subparagraph 13 c stipulates that rotation of military personnel shall be conducted on a man-for-man basis, and subparagraph 13 d stipulates that combat aircraft, armoured vehicles, weapons and ammunition which are destroyed, damaged, worn out or used up during the period of the armistice may be replaced on the basis of piece-for-piece of the same effectiveness and the same type.

Subparagraphs 13 c and 13 d also stipulate that rotation of military personnel and replacement of weapons and combat <u>matériel</u> can be conducted only through the ports of entry enumerated in the AA (Sinuiju, Chongjin, Hungnam, Manoo and Sinanju which are under the control of the North and Inchon, Taegu, Pusan, Kangnung and Kunsan which are under the control of the South of Korea) and under the supervision of the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams (NNIT).

To carry out its mission, the NNSC organized 20 Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, stationing a half of them in the ports of entry in the north and south of Korea and the other half in the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission headquarters.

On 31 July 1953, the fourth day after the signing of the AA, the UNC side shipped into south Korea boxes of 106 dismantled 4.2-inch mortars under the cloak of "PX" supply in violation of subparagraph 13 d which prohibits military equipments from being reinforced into Korea. It was disclosed by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams.

Since the armistice of 15 April 1954, 177 combat aircraft, 465 howitzers of various calibres, 6,400 rocket guns, 145 mortars, 1,365 machine-guns and millions of rounds of various ammunition have been discovered by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams while the UNC side was introducing such weapons and combat matériel in such deceptive and fraudulent ways.

When its AA violations were successively detected and exposed by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, the UNC side hindered NNIT's activities in every way.

Subparagraph 13 g of the AA stipulates that the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams are to be afforded "full protection and all possible assistance and cooperation" and "the freedom and conveniences necessary in the carrying out of their functions and responsibilities".

The UNC side, however, hindered the legal activities of the members of the NNITs on the unwarranted pretexts, inflicted violence upon them from time to time, threatened their personal safeties and even killed them, thus committing barbarous criminal acts without hesitation.

The UNC side instigated the south Korean side to hold a threatening demonstration in demand of the withdrawal of the NNITs in August 1955 and committed the outrageous acts of attacking and destroying the camps of the NNITs in the ports of entry in Pusan, Inchon, Taegu, Kunsan and other areas.

The UNC side kicked up so many commotions against the NNITs that it at last forcibly expelled the NNITs from south Korea in June 1956.

In this way, the UNC side introduced a great deal of combat matériel in disruption and violation of the AA and increased south Korean forces from 16 divisions at the time of the armistice to 31 divisions in 1956.

The UNC side went to the length of publicly announcing its unilateral abrogation of subparagraph 13 d in June 1957, one year after it had expelled the NNITs from south Korea.

Since then, the UNC side has taken the road of more overtly turning south Korea into a nuclear base.

The UNC side reorganized the United States Seventh Division stationed in south Korea and the United States First Panzer Division brought from Japan into atomic divisions equipped with "tactical nuclear arms" and introduced into south Korea the "Honest John" rocket battalion and 280mm Atomic gun battalion and formed the United States fourth guided missile command.

In the 1960s the United States introduced "Lacrosse" guided missiles and many other nuclear weapons and in the 1970s declared south Korea its "forward defence area" and introduced "Pershing" and "Lance" missiles there.

According to the announcement by the United States military experts and the United States defence information centre, the United States has already introduced into south Korea 192 nuclear bombs for fighter bombers, 56 nuclear shells for 8-inch guns, 152 nuclear shells for 155mm guns, 12 nuclear warheads for "sergeant" ground-to-ground missiles, 80 nuclear warheads for "Honest John" missiles, 144 nuclear warheads for "Nike Hercules" missiles, 12 nuclear warheads for "Lance" missiles and 150 nuclear mines.

According to the Washington Post dated 2 May 1983, in addition to this the United States introduced a total of 248 nuclear weapons, including 133 nuclear bombs for aircraft, 63 nuclear shells for 8-inch howitzers, 31 nuclear shells for 155mm howitzers and 21 nuclear mines.

As seen above, the United States has introduced and deployed in south Korea over 1,000 pieces of nuclear weapons of various kinds, including nuclear bombs, nuclear shells, nuclear warheads, nuclear mines and the like.

According to an analysis, the total explosive power of the nuclear weapons in south Korea amounts to 13,000 kilotons, which is 1,000 times that of the A-bomb dropped in Hiroshima in 1945, killing hundreds of thousands of people.

As mentioned above, the UNC side has not only destroyed the NNIT's inspection function and turned south Korea into a nuclear base, the biggest in the Far East, but also named a south Korean army "general" who has neither qualification nor authority as the Senior Member of the UNC side, thus paralysing the major function of the MAC and making the NNSC hardly find its working object and completely lose justification for its existence, though it has so far existed symbolically.

Since May 1991, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission has been unable to have meetings, which used to be held once a week even for a short time, to discuss daily reports on the rotation of military personnel and replacement of weapons and combat matériel.

Such developments resulting from the actions on the part of the UNC side have prevented NNSC from carrying out any official activities and placed it in an embarrassing position which is not helpful to the implementation of AA.

## New war provocation machination by the United Nations Command side

### Military provocations on the ground, at sea and in the air

Paragraph 6 of the Korean Armistice Agreement stipulates that neither side shall "execute any hostile act within, from, or against the Demilitarized Zone" and paragraph 14 thereof stipulates that "ground forces shall respect the Demilitarized Zone and the area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side".

Paragraph 15 thereof prescribes that "naval forces shall respect the waters contiguous to the Demilitarized Zone and to the land area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side" and paragraph 16 thereof prescribes that "air forces shall respect the airspace over the Demilitarized Zone and over the area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side, and over the waters contiguous to both".

The UNC side, however, has kept on committing military provocations and criminal acts against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the air, on the ground and at sea in flagrant violation of these requirements of the Armistice Agreement to strain the situation on the Korean Peninsula.

- The south Korean army (SKA) committed military provocations of infiltrating a high-speed boat deep into the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea southwest of the Ongjin Peninsula in the West Sea of Korea at about 1957 hours on 29 July last year and three combat vessels into the same place at about 2220 hours the same day.

- The south Korean army infiltrated two combat vessels into the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea west of Changsangot in the West Sea of Korea at about 1810 hours on 1 August last year, and committed a grave military provocation of firing large-calibre machine-gun fire at a spot 800 metres south of military demarcation line (MDL) Marker No. 0493 in the DMZ of the western front at about 0957 hours on 23 August last year.

- The south Korean army fired 18 explosive shells at a place 1,200 metres southwest of MDL Marker No. 0587 in the DMZ of the central front at about 1440 hours on 14 September last year, and committed the military provocation of firing over 350 rounds of heavy and automatic weapon fire towards the Korean People's Army soldiers from a spot 860 metres south of MDL Marker No. 0582 at about 1100 hours on 15 September last year, thus seriously threatening the safety of our civil police and destroying their post.

- The UNC side committed a criminal act of dispatching a fighter to the air over Nampo-ri Kaepung county, Kaesong city; between about 1042 hours and 1045 hours on 28 September last year.

- The south Korean army infiltrated a destroyer deep into the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea west of Changsangot in the West Sea of Korea at about 0650 hours on 4 October last year and fired automatic weapon fire at a place 1,600 metres south of MDL Marker No. 0190 in the DMZ of the western front at about 0910 hours on 30 October last year.

- The south Korean army infiltrated a combat vessel deep into the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea west of Tungsangot in the West Sea, and committed military provocations of seriously threatening the safety of the Korean People's Army soldiers by firing automatic weapon fire in the DMZ of the eastern front on 1, 2 and 5 November last year.

- The south Korean army committed a military provocation of gravely threatening the safety of the Korean People's Army soldiers and damaging facilities of their post by firing 12.7mm large-calibre machine-gun fire at a spot 1,100 metres south of MDL Marker No. 0666 in the DMZ of the central front at about 1716 hours on 31 December last year.

- The south Korean army further increased military provocations and criminal acts ushering in 1991.

Particularly between January and April, during which the provocative "Team Spirit '91" combined military exercise was conducted, they committed as many as 12 armed military provocations and air violations and sea provocations, thereby further aggravating the situation on the Korean Peninsula.

The UNC side committed as many as over 30 such armed provocations against the KPA side between 1 July last year and 30 May this year.

According to paragraph 10 of the Korean AA, at the 4th MAC meeting held on 31 July 1953, both sides reached an agreement that they carry pistols and rifles only within the DMZ. The UNC side, however, introduces into the DMZ numerous tanks, armoured vehicles, large-calibre artillery pieces and automatic weapons in gross violation of the agreement.

The number of such violations by the UNC side of the AA and its subsequent agreements amounts to as many as over 23,000 cases between 27 July last year and the end of May this year.

The situation on the Korean Peninsula is always tense and a danger of the fuse of war being ignited at any moment is hovering over Korea.

War exercises against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

The UNC side has ceaselessly conducted war exercises against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the last and the current year (between 1 July 1990 and 30 June 1991).

The typical example is the south Korea-United States combined military exercise called "Team Spirit".

This year's exercise, the sixteenth of its series, was a nuclear war exercise against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as usual.

The "Team Spirit '91" combined military exercise was conducted from January to the end of April with mobilization of huge armed forces, aircraft and the latest combat equipment incomparable to that of any country or bloc.

The main contents of the "Team Spirit" war exercise is sea landing operation, ground offensive operation, river-crossing operation, commando operation, air striking operation and so on.

At the 459th meeting of the MAC the Korean People's Army and Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) side to the MAC proposed to the UNC side that a "Recommendation to the Government Authorities Concerned" be made to prevent daily growing tension and war exercises from causing grave consequences.

The following is the contents of the recommendation.

> "We, both sides of the MAC, admitting that conducting large-scale military exercises like the "Team Spirit" in the unstable state of armistice on the Korean Peninsula where huge armed forces of both sides are confronting each other across the MDL serves to aggravate tension, increase war danger and lay grave obstacles to the north-south dialogue making good progress, recommend the governments of the north and south of Korea and of the United States to sit together as soon as possible to discuss the matter of discontinuing large-scale military exercises on the Korean Peninsula."

The UNC side, however, failed to accept the proposal of the KPA/CPV side and extremely aggravated the situation and suspended the north-south dialogue by staging the "Team Spirit '91" war exercise.

On the other hand, the south Korean side conducts such war exercises as "Myolgong", "Piho", "Pangpae", "Ttangbol" and the like throughout the year regarding the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as an imaginary enemy.

Owing to this, the situation on the Korean Peninsula is tense and peace is threatened momentarily.

* * *

Today it is unthinkable to prevent war and safeguard peace on the Korean Peninsula apart from global peace and security.

If a war breaks out in Korea, it will be a nuclear war and not be confined within the Korean Peninsula only but escalate into a world-wide thermonuclear war.

Those who really treasure peace and worry about the fate of human beings, should not turn their face away from the grave situation on the Korean Peninsula no matter where they are and what they do.

The KPA/CPV side to the MAC expresses a firm belief that the United Nations Members which treasure peace and endeavour for it will pay serious attention to the fact that the United States has been threatening peace on the Korean Peninsula and inflicting immeasurable sufferings and misfortunes on the Korean people for as long as 38 years under the signboard of the United Nations and that they will extend in future too, as in the past, firm solidarity with us making sincere efforts for the reunification of Korea, easing tension on the Korean Peninsula, realizing disarmament and removing war danger.

---

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/22840
26 July 1991
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 25 JULY 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF BELGIUM TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Mission of Belgium to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General and has the honour, with reference to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 700 (1991), to provide him with the following information:

The export of arms and munitions to Iraq has been subject to sanctions in Belgium since 1980; the sanctions were, furthermore, confirmed at the beginning of 1990 by the Ministerial External Relations Committee. As of 8 August 1990, Belgium took the necessary measures to implement the commercial and financial sanctions adopted by the Security Council in its resolution 661 (1990) (see document S/AC.25/1990/2, entitled "Measures taken by Belgium in application of Security Council resolution 661 (1990)").

It has thus been possible to ensure compliance with the provisions of article 24 of resolution 687 (1991) without the creation of any additional legal instruments.

Legislation

Belgian laws and regulations are fully consistent with the obligations set out in resolution 687 (1991), as well as with the previous binding decisions of the Council. The export of arms and military matériel is subject to the provisions of the Act of 11 September 1962 on the import, export and transit of goods, of the Royal Enforcement Decree of 24 October 1962 and of the Ministerial Decree of 8 August 1990, requiring the production of a licence for the export to Iraq of any products originating in or coming from the European Community.

Belgium also applies the regulations formulated by the European Community to govern exports to Iraq in accordance with the resolutions of the Security Council (such as Regulation (EEC) 2340-90).

Apart from these provisions, which cover all types of exports, Belgium also has legislation that dictates a very strict procedure for the export of nuclear materials and equipment (Act of 9 February 1991 and Royal Decree of 12 May 1989).

In addition, Belgium points out that, under the Act of 10 July 1978, it has prohibited the development, production, stockpiling or transfer of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and has acceded to the related Convention of London, Moscow and Washington of 14 April 1972.

Implementation

The competent authorities are the Customs and Excise Administration within the Ministry of Finance and the Central Office for Quotas and Licences within the Ministry of Economic Affairs.

Documentation and goods are monitored by the Economic Inspectorate and the Customs Administration. There is a clause prohibiting the re-export of such goods.

The only permits granted by Belgium for exports to Iraq have related to food products and urgent requirements in accordance with the rules set out in resolution 661 (1990) and in resolution 687 (1991), in the light of the report of Mr. M. Ahtisaari (document S/22366).

In addition, with a view to ensuring strict compliance with the decisions of the Security Council, Belgium has ensured that these decisions are made known to the institutions and establishments concerned.

Note

Belgium points out that a draft act on the import, export and transit of arms, munitions and equipment for specifically military use and of related technology has just been approved by the Belgian Parliament. The fact that a specific act should govern international trade in such products is an innovation. The intention of the Belgian legislator is more effectively to combat the illicit traffic in weapons and thus to ensure the attainment of the objectives established by the United Nations in that regard.

---

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/22841
26 July 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 25 JULY 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

In response to your Note SCPC/7/91(4-1) of 3 July 1991, I am writing to inform you about the measures undertaken by the United Kingdom to implement Security Council resolution 700 (1991).

Current United Kingdom laws and regulations already meet the obligations and requirements of resolution 687 (1991) as regards the sale, supply, or the promotion or facilitation of the sale or supply of goods to Iraq, including those items specified in paragraph 24 of resolution 687 (1991). The Guidelines adopted by Security Council resolution 700 (1991) fall largely within the scope of existing United Kingdom legislation. This includes the following Orders in Council:

- The Hong Kong (Control of Gold, Securities, Payments and Credits: Kuwait and Republic of Iraq) Order 1990 (6 August 1990);

- The Caribbean Territories (Control of Gold, Securities, Payments and Credits: Kuwait and Republic of Iraq) Order 1990: SI No. 1625 (6 August 1990);

- The Iraq and Kuwait (United Nations Sanctions) Order 1990; SI No. 1651 (8 August 1990);

- The Iraq and Kuwait (United Nations Sanctions) (Dependent Territories) Order 1990: SI No. 1652 (8 August 1990);

- The Export of Goods (Control) (Iraq and Kuwait Sanctions) Order 1990: SI No. 1640 (8 August 1990);

- The Iraq and Kuwait (United Nations Sanctions) (Amendment) Order 1990: SI No. 1768 (29 August 1990);

- The Iraq and Kuwait (United Nations Sanctions) (Bermuda) Order 1990: SI No. 1769 (29 August 1990);

- The Iraq and Kuwait (United Nations Sanctions) (Dependent Territories) (Amendment) Order 1990: SI No. 1770 (29 August 1990);

- The Iraq and Kuwait (United Nations Sanctions) (Channel Islands) Order 1990: SI No. 1771 (29 August 1990);

- The Iraq and Kuwait (United Nations Sanctions) (No. 2) Order 1990 (5 October 1990);

- The Iraq and Kuwait (United Nations Sanctions) (Dependent Territories) (No. 2) Order 1990 (5 October 1990);

- The Iraq and Kuwait (United Nations Sanctions) (Second Amendment) Order 1990: SI No. 2144 (31 October 1990).

Her Majesty's Treasury issued a separate legal direction - the Control of Gold, Securities, Payments and Credits (Republic of Iraq) Directions 1990: SI No. 1616 - on 4 August 1990. The Bank of England issued a notice - Emergency Laws (Re-enactments and Appeals) Act 1964: Iraq - on 7 August 1990.

In addition, the European Community has enacted the following legislation preventing trade by Community members with Iraq:

- EEC regulation 2340/90 extended and amended by EEC regulation 3155/90.

- ECSC decision 90/414.

These regulations and decisions have direct effect in the United Kingdom.

The controls on the sale or supply of technology and personnel or materials referred to in subparagraphs (c) and (d) of paragraph 24 of resolution 687 (1991) will be reinforced by a new Order in Council. This will be self-contained and will fully implement all the requirements of paragraph 24, and the Guidelines adopted by Security Council resolution 700 (1991). A copy of the new Order in Council will be made available to the United Nations when it has been promulgated. The legislation will provide for criminal sanctions in the form of imprisonment or fines. Responsibilities for enforcement of the new legislation will fall largely to the Department of Trade and Industry and Her Majesty's Customs and Excise.

I should be grateful if you would arrange for this letter to be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) D. H. A. HANNAY

---

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/22842
26 July 1991
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: SPANISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 25 JULY 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF SPAIN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General and has the honour to refer to his note verbale SCPC/7/91(4-1), which draws attention to paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5 of Security Council resolution 700 (1991).

In this connection, and in accordance with paragraph 4 of resolution 700 (1991), the Permanent Representative of Spain is pleased to transmit the following information concerning measures adopted by the Government of Spain to fulfil the obligations set out in paragraph 24 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991).

Following the invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi troops, the Spanish Government in August 1990 adopted a series of measures (Ministerial Orders of 4 and 6 August, pursuant to Regulations (EEC) 2340/90 and 3155/90), imposing general sanctions on the export of defence matériel to Iraq, immediately suspending the issuance of export licences and instructing all Spanish customs units to freeze any operation which might already be under way.

Since August 1990, the Interministerial Board with responsibility for monitoring external trade in defence matériel and in products and technologies susceptible to dual use (a body comprising representatives of the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs whose responsibility it is to authorize or to refuse export licences for defence matériel and which monitors implementation of and compliance with the sanctions) has granted no new licences for exports to Iraq; any permits relating to contracts authorized prior to the imposition of the sanctions have been cancelled.

The ban on exports or imports of defence matériel to or from Iraq applies to all types of equipment, including spare parts, and also covers the transit, temporary import and export and deposit in a free-trade zone of such matériel.

---

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/22843
29 July 1991
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 26 JULY 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that United States aircraft continue to violate Iraqi airspace, as follows:

United States air activity inside Iraqi airspace on 24/25 July 1991 amounted to 10 sorties flown by one four-aircraft formation and two two-aircraft formations at speeds of 700 to 900 kilometres per hour and altitudes of 2 to 4 kilometres and one formation at a speed of 360 kilometres per hour at altitudes of 2 to 4 kilometres.

Air activity was centred over Arbil, Amadiyah, northern Mosul and Dohuk, and it had the purpose of observation and provocation.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdul Amir A. AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

---

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/22844
29 July 1991
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 29 JULY 1991 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF SAUDI ARABIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I refer to the letter addressed to you on 22 July 1991 by the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations (S/22821) and to its two annexes, dated 17 April and 6 May, in which mention is made of sorties carried out by the Saudi Air Force over Iraqi territory after the entry into force of the cease-fire.

I also refer to our letter of 9 May 1991 (S/22584) and, on instructions from my Government, should like to inform you that, following the necessary inquiries by the competent authorities in the Kingdom, it has been established that the statements made in the letters of the Permanent Representative of Iraq relating to the Saudi Air Force bear no resemblance to reality and constitute an allegation that has absolutely no truth. The Kingdom is involved in no air activity in Iraqi airspace and has been involved in no such activity since the moment the cease-fire went into effect.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohammed H. Mirdass AL-KAHTANY
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

---

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/22845
29 July 1991
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 29 JULY 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that the massive destruction wrought by the United States and its allies on Iraq's civilian facilities and infrastructure in the course of their military operations, which lasted from the night of 16/17 January 1991 until 28 February 1991, clearly demonstrated the iniquitous character of the United States and its unlawful use of the cover of international legitimacy and Security Council resolutions in order to destroy an entire people.

Not content with the more than 90,000 tons of bombs which they dropped during over 100,000 air raids on Iraqi cities and installations, United States aircraft continued - even after the cessation of hostilities and on the pretext of conducting reconnaissance - to carry out intensive air activity in Iraqi airspace, to shoot down unarmed aircraft, to destroy tanks, to drop airborne troops onto roads inside Iraq and to intercept Iraqi helicopters which were performing civilian duties and carrying civilian officials, political figures and relief agency delegations inside Iraq because military operations had destroyed and cut most of the country's land transportation routes.

The following are details of these acts of provocation:

| Date | Details |
|---|---|
| 1/2 July | Twelve sorties flown by six formations at speeds of 600 to 700 km/h and at low and medium altitudes over Arbil and Mosul, for the purpose of observation and provocation |
| 2/3 July | Ten sorties flown by five formations at speeds of 600 to 700 km/h and at low and medium altitudes over Mosul, Arbil, Dohuk and Tall 'Afar, for the purpose of observation and provocation |
| 3/4 July | Twenty-two sorties flown by 11 formations at speeds of 600 to 900 km/h and at low and medium altitudes over Arbil, Mosul, Zakho, Dohuk and Amadiyah, for the purpose of observation and provocation, achieved when the American aircraft ejected flares north of Sadd al-Mawsil at 2040 hours |

| Date | Details |
|---|---|
| 4/5 July | Twenty-two sorties flown by 11 formations at speeds of 600 to 900 km/h and at low and medium altitudes over Mosul, Arbil, Dohuk, Zakho, Tall 'Afar and Sadd al-Mawsil, for the purpose of observation and provocation |
| 5/6 July | Three sorties flown by one two-aircraft formation and one single aircraft over Dohuk, Amadiyah and north of Mosul, for the purpose of observation and provocation |
| 6/7 July | Twelve sorties flown by six formations at speeds of 600 to 720 km/h and at medium and low altitudes over Mosul, Dohuk, Zakho and Tall 'Afar, for the purpose of observation and provocation |
| 7/8 July | Seventeen sorties flown by eight two-aircraft formations and one single aircraft at speeds of 600 to 900 km/h and at low and medium altitudes over Mosul, Arbil and Dohuk, for the purpose of observation and provocation, achieved by low-altitude flights over Sadd al-Mawsil |
| 8/9 July | Thirty-three sorties flown by 16 two-aircraft formations and one single aircraft at speeds of 700 to 900 km/h and at medium altitudes over Arbil, Mosul and Rawanduz, for the purpose of observation and provocation |
| 9/10 July | Thirty-one sorties flown by 13 two-aircraft formations and five single aircraft at speeds of 600 to 900 km/h and at low and medium altitudes over Mosul, Arbil, Tall 'Afar, Sinjar, Dohuk, Zakho and Dukan, for the purpose of observation and provocation |
| 10/11 July | Thirty-seven sorties flown by 18 formations and one single aircraft at speeds of 600 to 800 km/h and at low and medium altitudes over Mosul, Dohuk and Arbil, for the purpose of observation and provocation |
| 11/12 July | Nineteen sorties flown by nine formations and one single aircraft at speeds of 600 to 720 km/h and at low and medium altitudes (4,000-5,000 metres) over Dohuk, Arbil, the area north of Mosul and Amadiyah, for the purpose of observation and provocation |
| 12/13 July | Twenty-nine sorties flown by 12 two-aircraft formations and five single aircraft at speeds of 700 to 900 km/h and at altitudes ranging from 2,000 to 8,500 metres over Mosul, Dohuk, Arbil, Amadiyah, Rawanduz and Zakho, for the purpose of observation and provocation |

| Date | Details |
|---|---|
| 13/14 July | Thirty-two sorties flown by 15 two-aircraft formations and two single aircraft at speeds of 600 to 900 km/h and at low and medium altitudes over Arbil, Mosul, Dohuk and Rawanduz, for the purpose of observation and provocation |
| 14/15 July | Twenty-three sorties flown by 11 formations and one single aircraft at speeds of 600 to 720 km/h and at low and medium altitudes over Arbil, Mosul and Dohuk, for the purpose of observation and provocation |
| 15/16 July | Twenty-seven sorties flown by 13 formations and one single aircraft at speeds of 700 to 900 km/h and at altitudes ranging from 500 to 4,000 metres over Dohuk, Arbil, Mosul, Tall 'Afar and Amadiyah, for the purpose of observation and provocation |
| 16/17 July | Twelve sorties flown by six formations at speeds of 600 to 800 km/h and at low and medium altitudes over Mosul, Dohuk and north of Arbil, for the purpose of observation and provocation |
| 17/18 July | Eighteen sorties flown by five two-aircraft formations, one four-aircraft formation and four single aircraft at speeds of 600 to 720 km/h and at low and medium altitudes over Mosul and Arbil, for the purpose of observation and provocation |
| 18/19 July | Twenty-five sorties flown by 12 formations and one single aircraft at speeds of 700 to 900 km/h and at low and medium altitudes over Mosul, Arbil, Dohuk, Amadiyah and Tall 'Afar, for the purpose of observation and provocation |
| 19/20 July | Sixteen sorties flown by eight formations at speeds of 600 to 700 km/h and at altitudes ranging from 4,000 to 5,000 metres over Mosul, Arbil and Dohuk, for the purpose of observation and provocation |
| 20/21 July | Six sorties flown by three two-aircraft formations at speeds of 600 to 700 km/h and at medium altitudes over Dohuk and north of Mosul, for the purpose of observation and provocation |
| 21/22 July | Twenty sorties flown by nine two-aircraft formations and two single aircraft at speeds of 700 to 900 km/h and at low and medium altitudes over the area north of Mosul, Dohuk and the areas north and west of Arbil, for the purpose of observation and provocation |
| 22/23 July | Nineteen sorties flown by nine formations and one single aircraft at speeds of 650 to 720 km/h and at altitudes ranging from 4,000 to 5,000 metres over Mosul, Arbil and Dohuk, for the purpose of observation and provocation |

| Date | Details |
|---|---|
| 23/24 July | Thirty-four sorties flown by 12 two-aircraft formations, two three-aircraft formations and four single aircraft at speeds of 600 to 950 km/h and at altitudes ranging from 3,000 to 8,500 metres over Arbil, Mosul, Dohuk, Amadiyah and north of Rawanduz, for the purpose of observation and provocation, achieved when the aircraft ejected flares and broke the sound barrier over the areas east and north of Mosul |
| 24/25 July | Eight sorties flown by one four-aircraft formation and two two-aircraft formations at speeds of 700 to 900 km/h and at altitudes ranging from 2,000 to 4,000 metres over Arbil, Amadiyah, north of Mosul and Dohuk, for the purpose of observation and provocation |

In placing these facts before the Secretary-General of the United Nations, members of the Security Council and all the nations, peoples and organizations of the world, we hope that the world will appreciate the length to which America has gone in its excessive and unjustified use of force, thus violating Security Council resolutions, showing contempt for the feelings of Iraqi citizens and disturbing their tranquillity and security.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdul Amir A. AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

---